By interpreting message authentication as a hypothesis testing problem, this paper provides a generalized treatment of information-theoretic lower bounds on an opponent's probability of cheating in one-way message authentication. We consider the authentication of an arbitrary sequence of messages, using the same secret key shared between sender and receiver. The adversary tries to deceive the receiver by forging one of the messages in the sequence. The classical two types of cheating are considered, impersonation and substitution attacks, and lower bounds on the cheating probability for any authentication system are derived for three types of goals the adversary might wish to achieve. These goals are (a) that the fraudulent message should be accepted by the receiver, or, in addition, (b) that the adversary wishes to know or (c) wants to even choose the value of the plaintext message obtained by the legitimate receiver after decoding with the secret key.
I. Introduction
Message authentication is concerned with providing evidence to the receiver of a message that it was sent by a speci ed legitimate sender, even in the presence of an opponent who can intercept messages sent by the legitimate sender and send a fraudulent message to the receiver. Authenticity (like con dentiality) can be achieved by cryptographic coding based on a secret key shared by sender and receiver.
The security of cryptographic systems can be classi ed according to the assumed computational resources of an adversary. Security that holds when one assumes a suitable restriction on an adversary's computing power is called computational security while security that holds even when no bound on the adversary's computing power is assumed is called information-theoretic security.
This paper is concerned with information-theoretically secure message authentication, i.e., we consider a scenario in which the opponent has unlimited computing power and knows everything about the system, except for the secret key. We consider bounds on how e ciently a secret key shared by sender and receiver can be used or, more precisely, we derive lower bounds on an opponent's cheating probability that no authentication system with a given key size can overcome.
Compared to the theory of secrecy, de nitions in authentication theory are more subtle. For instance, while Shannon's de nition of perfect secrecy 15], which means that ciphertext and plaintext are statistically independent, is obviously the strongest possible de nition of secrecy, it is not clear how perfect authenticity should be de ned; the cheating probability can be made arbitrarily small by using a secret key of su cient size, but it can never be reduced to zero. Shannon 15] proved the well-known result that for any perfect cipher the secret key must be at least as long as the plaintext or, more precisely, that H(K) H(M) where M and K denote the message and the secret key, respectively. We refer to 8] for a generalization of Shannon's treatment of secrecy.
The rst lower bound results in message authentication were purely combinatorial 4], 3]. In 1984, Simmons 16 ] initiated a sequence of research activities on information-theoretic lower bounds in authentication theory 2 The goal of this paper is give a generalized and considerably simpli ed treatment of lower bound results in authentication theory. The key to this simpli cation is the natural observation that authentication, i.e. deciding whether a received message is authentic or not, is a hypothesis testing problem. The receiver is faced with two possible hypotheses: either the message was generated by the legitimate sender knowing the secret key, or by an opponent without a priori knowledge of the secret key. The joint probability distribution of the authenticated message and the secret key is di erent in both cases, and this may allow the receiver to distinguish between the two hypotheses. The goal of the paper is similar in spirit to some of Sgarro's work (cf. 13], 14]) who also investigated a general approach to authentication frauds, based on rate-distortion theory, showing that some of the known bounds follow from a more general result. Like Shannon's lower bounds 15] on the size of a secret key of a perfect secrecy system, the bounds of this paper show the impossibility of obtaining an arbitrary amount of security with a secret key of xed size. Constructions of authentication systems are not discussed in this paper, but there exists a substantial body of literature on that topic.
In Section II we discuss the message authentication problem and various cheating strategies. The literature is brie y reviewed in Section III, and hypothesis testing is described in Section IV. Lower bounds on the cheating probability for impersonation and substitution attacks are derived in Sections V and VI, respectively, and these results are combined in the concluding Section VII.
II. Message Authentication and Cheating Strategies
Consider a scenario in which a sender and a receiver share a secret key K. The sender wants to send a sequence of plaintext messages M 1 ; M 2 ; : : : ; M n , at some independent time instances, in an authenticated manner to the receiver. Each message M i is authenticated separately by sending an encoded message or ciphertext 1 C i which depends (possibly probabilistically) on K and M i . In order to be fully general, and in contrast to the previous literature, we also allow C i to depend on the previous plaintext messages M 1 ; : : : ; M i?1 and the previous ciphertexts C 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 .
Based on C i and K, and possibly also on M 1 ; : : : ; M i?1 and C 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 , the receiver decides to either reject the ciphertext or accept it as authentic and, in case of acceptance, decodes C i to a messagê M i . It is assumed that the receiver is synchronized, i.e., he knows the message number i. Without loss of generality we assume that M i is uniquely determined by M 1 ; : : : ; M i?1 , C 1 ; : : : ; C i and K and hence, by induction, also by C 1 ; : : : ; C i and K alone:
In typical authentication systems, the message M i is often determined by the ciphertext C i , i.e., the system provides no secrecy. In such a system without secrecy we have H(M i jC i ) = 0 or, more generally,
Authentication schemes without secrecy are often called Cartesian. Our analysis applies to authentication codes that do or do not provide secrecy, be it full or partial.
Following standard practice it is assumed that an adversary knows everything about the system, including the codes used and the plaintext statistics, but that he has no a priori information about the secret key. To remove a possible source of confusion it should be pointed out that in the authentication literature plaintext message and ciphertext are also referred to as source state and message, denoted by S and M, respectively.
The adversary is assumed to have full (read and write) access to the communication channel. The adversary's strategy is to select an arbitrary (e.g. optimal) time index i of the ciphertext to be forged. Then he chooses between two di erent types of attacks.
In a so-called impersonation attack at time i, the adversary waits until he has seen the ciphertexts C 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 (which he lets pass unchanged to the receiver) and then creates and sends a fraudulent ciphertextC i which he hopes to be accepted by the receiver as the ith ciphertext C i .
In a so-called substitution attack at time i, the adversary lets pass ciphertexts C 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 , intercepts C i , and replaces it by a di erent ciphertextC i which he hopes to be accepted by the receiver. In a substitution attack, an adversary can of course only be considered successful whenC i is decoded by the receiver to a plaintext messageM i di erent from the message M i actually sent by the sender.
In order to de ne what it means for an adversary to be successful in an impersonation or a substitution attack, we can distinguish between three di erent goals the adversary might want to achieve, which are described below. In the previous literature, only the rst of these cases has been considered. The adversary can be considered successful when (a) the receiver acceptsC i as a valid ciphertext. (b) the receiver acceptsC i as a valid ciphertext and decodes it to a messageM i known to the adversary. In other words, an adversary is only considered successful if he also guesses the receiver's decoded messageM i correctly.
(c) For a given xed message x (on which the attack depends), the receiver accepts C i as a valid ciphertext and decodes it asM i = x. Note that cases (b) and (c) di er from (a) only when the plaintext message is not contained in (or uniquely determined by) the ciphertext, i.e., when the system also provides some degree of secrecy and hence H(M i jC 1 : : : C i ) > 0. These three cases apply to both the impersonation and the substitution attack.
For an impersonation attack at time i on a given authentication scheme we will denote the probabilities of success for an optimal attack, for the three described scenarios, by P I;i , P 0 I;i and P 00 I;i;m (x), respectively. Similarly, for a substitution attack at time i on a given authentication scheme we will denote the probabilities of success for an optimal attack, for the three described scenarios, by P S;i , P 0 S;i and P 00 S;i;m (x), respectively. However, the same bound will apply to all of these probabilities, and hence they need not be distinguished.
When considering the same success probabilities for a particular observed sequence The signi cance of a lower bound result in authentication theory depends on the generality of the considered model. Instead of reviewing in detail the various papers on the subject, we brie y summarize the restrictions of the existing results and the generalizations achieved in this paper. In all previous papers it is assumed that the receiver never makes an error when seeing a valid ciphertext, i.e., that his strategy is to accept a ciphertext if and only if it is consistent with the given secret key K. Our results are more general in that we also provide bounds on an adversary's cheating probability when a certain tolerable non-zero probability of rejecting a valid ciphertext is speci ed. While this generalization does not appear to be of much practical interest, it is useful because it establishes the link to the standard hypothesis testing scenario. Our results hold in a general model without any of the discussed restrictions. Moreover, we need not assume that M 1 ; M 2 ; : : : are independent and we can allow the encoding rule for message M i to depend on the previous plaintext messages M 1 ; : : : ; M i?1 . Furthermore, as discussed above, the realistic alternative models in which an adversary is considered successful only when he knows (or can choose) the plaintext message to which the receiver decodes the fraudulent ciphertext, have not been considered previously.
IV. Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis testing is the task of deciding which of two hypotheses, H 0 or H 1 , is true, when one is given the value of a random variable U (e.g., the outcome of a measurement). The behavior of U is described by two probability distributions: If H 0 or H 1 is true, then U is distributed according to the distribution P UjH 0 or P UjH 1 , respectively. For ease of notation we will write P UjH 0 = P U and P UjH 1 = Q U .
A decision rule assigns one of the two hypotheses to each possible value u that U can assume. There are two types of possible errors in making a decision. Accepting hypothesis H 1 when H 0 is actually true is called a type I error, and the probability of this event is denoted by . Accepting hypothesis H 0 when H 1 is actually true is called a type II error, and the probability of this event is denoted by . The optimal decision rule is given by the famous Neyman-Pearson theorem which states that, for a given maximal tolerable probability of type II error, can be minimized by assuming hypothesis H 0 if and only if log
for some threshold T depending on . Here and in the sequel, logarithms are understood to be taken to the base 2. Note that only the existence of T , but not its value is speci ed by this theorem. The term on the left of (1) is called the log-likelihood ratio. We refer to 1] for an excellent treatment of hypothesis testing. Let P U and Q U be arbitrary probability distributions over the same nite or countably in nite set U. The expected value of the log-likelihood ratio with respect to P U is called the discrimination and is de ned by
The discrimination is non-negative and is equal to zero if and only if the two distributions are identical. In particular, for = 0 we have ? log L(P U ; Q U ) which is equivalent to 2 ?L(P U ;Q U ) : Consider the special case of hypothesis testing where U = S; T ] consists of a pair of random variables S and T , where P U = P ST is the actual joint distribution of this pair and where Q U = P S P T is the product of the two marginal distributions. This special case will be important in the analysis of impersonation attacks. Note that P ST and P S P T are both probability distributions over the same set S T (where S and T take on values in S and T , respectively). We have L(P ST ; P S P T ) = X s;t P ST (s; t) log P ST (s; t) P S (s)P T (t)
where the standard de nitions of the entropy H(S) of a random variable S, of the mutual information I(S; T ) between two random variables S and T , and (below) of conditional entropy and conditional mutual information are used. We also refer to 1] for an excellent introduction to information theory. The second and third step of (2) follow from these de nitions. We have L(P ST ; P S P T ) = 0 if and only if the two distributions P ST and P S P T are identical, i.e., if and only if S and T are statistically independent. This fact is needed for deriving the conditions for equality in the lower bounds which, however, we consider not su ciently interesting to state in this paper. The above considerations can be generalized to a scenario where the testing person knows a random variable V , which can be considered as side information. In other words, we consider a collection of pairs (P UjV =v ; Q UjV =v ) of distributions, each pair occurring with probability P V (v). The hypothesis testing strategy may depend on the value v of V , and for each v we can de ne (v) and (v) as the error probabilities of type I and II, respectively, given that V = v. An alternative form of Lemma 1 is We now return to the analysis of message authentication, in particular the impersonation attack. The problem of deciding whether a received ciphertextC is authentic or not can be viewed as a hypothesis testing problem. H 0 corresponds to the hypothesis that the ciphertext is authentic, and H 1 corresponds to the hypothesis that the ciphertext has been generated by an adversary. Referring to Section IV, we are interested in proving lower bounds on , for a given tolerated upper bound on . Such a result is stated in the form d( ; ) B for some bound B which for = 0 implies ? log B or, equivalently,
Consider an impersonation attack on the i-th message M i . The receiver knows K and the ciphertexts C 1 = c 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 = c i?1 , and sees a ciphertext C i , which could either be a correct ciphertext C i = C i sent by the legitimate receiver (hypothesis H 0 ) or a fraudulent ciphertext C i =C i inserted by an adversary (hypothesis H 1 ). A potential adversary would chooseC i depending on the observed particular ciphertexts C 1 = c 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 = c i?1 , but without further knowledge about the secret key.
In its most general form, an adversary's strategy for impersonation at time i can hence be described by an arbitrary probability distribution QC i jC 1 =c 1 ;:::;C i?1 =c i?1 , where we have used the symbol Q instead of P to make explicit that this is a di erent random experiment than that induced by a legitimate use of the system. Note that in a deterministic (non-splitting) strategy, QC i jC 1 =c 1 ;:::;C i?1 =c i?1 (c i ) is equal to 1 for one particular value c i , and zero otherwise.
In the sequel, consider probability distributions conditioned on the event that C 1 = c 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 = c i?1 . Under hypothesis H 0 , the pair C i ; K] (seen by the receiver) is generated according to the probability distribution It it worth discussing this last bound brie y. For the special case of authenticating only a single message M by the ciphertext C, it is Simmon's bound 16] which states that the impersonation probability is lower bounded by 2 ?I(C;K) . This means that unless C leaks a substantial amount of information about the secret key, authenticity is not achievable. Of course, C should not give all information about K since this would allow an adversary to guess K and successfully launch a substitution attack. For the general case of n messages, the theorem states that every ciphertext C i must give additional information about the key, otherwise the cheating probability in an impersonation attack is small. Proof. It su ces to describe one strategy that allows the adversary to achieve the cheating probabilities stated in the theorem. One admissible (but generally not optimal) strategy is for the adversary to chooseC i according to the probability distribution QC i jC 1 =c 1 ;:::;C i?1 =c i?1 = P C i jC 1 =c 1 ;:::;C i?1 =c i?1 : Observe that the distribution P C i jC 1 =c 1 ;:::;C i?1 =c i?1 does not depend on the particular choice of the secret key and hence is known to the adversary.
The rst inequality of the theorem then follows from equations (3) and (4) Consider now scenario (b) mentioned in Section II, i.e., in addition to havingC i accepted by the receiver the adversary also wants to know the messageM i the receiver decodes it to. This means, as can be expected, that cheating is less likely to succeed if the adversary also needs to know the message to which his fraudulent ciphertext is decoded to. In a system without secrecy, i.e. when M i is determineed by C i , there is no di erence between the two settings.
Consider now scenario (c) mentioned in Section II, i.e., in addition to havingC i accepted by the receiver, the adversary also wants the decoded messageM i to be equal to a particular value x.
The proof of Theorem 4 also holds when everything is conditioned on the further event M i = x. The bounds of the following corollary depend on the particular value x. Some x may allow a higher success probability than others, and of course the maximum over all values x is also a lower bound on Some lower bounds of this section for which = 0 could be strengthened further along the lines of 5] where it is suggested to optimize the bounds over choices of the distribution of the message, resulting in expressions involving the in mum of the mutual information between ciphertext and key, where the in mum is taken over choices of the plaintext distribution not changing the set of acceptable ciphertexts.
VI. Substitution Attacks
The bounds on the success probability in an impersonation attack show that in order for an authentication system to be secure, the ciphertexts C 1 ; : : : ; C i must give substantial information about the secret key K, thus reducing the adversary's uncertainty about K. One particular type of substitution attack is to try to guess the secret key K. If this succeeds, then any of the three forms of the substitution attack succeeds.
In this section we therefore rst derive lower bounds on an adversary's probability of guessing the correct value of K, given certain side information, which immediately yields a lower bound on the cheating probability for any of the substitution attacks.
Let S be a random variable. The entropy H(S) is the expected value of ? log P S (S). Because the minimum of the values occurring in the averaging, namely min s (? log P S (s)), is upper bounded by the average, it is straight-forward to prove that min s (? log P S (s)) = ? log(max s P S (s)) H(S) and hence that the probability of guessing S correctly when knowing only P S is lower bounded by Similarly, when considering side information given in form of the random variable T , where P SjT is known, we have max s P SjT=t(s) 2 ?H(SjT=t) for all t, and the average (over values of T ) success probability of guessing S when given T is 
Moreover, P S;i 2 ?H(KjC 1 C i ) : (8) These bounds also hold for the other two types (b) and (c) of substitution attacks.
VII. Conclusions
The results of this paper can be combined as described in the following. When a sequence of n messages, M 1 ; : : : ; M n , is to be authenticated using the same secret key K, an adversary could choose the type of attack with the highest success probability. A secret key K is used optimally when all these probabilities are (roughly) equal. When = 0 is required in all of these possible attacks, we obtain The following theorem follows from the fact that ?log(:) is a convex-function. It generalizes results of Walker 21] and Rosenbaum 10] .
Theorem 7: For every authentication scheme for authenticating n messages M 1 ; : : : ; M n in which the legitimate receiver never rejects a valid ciphertext, we have max(P I;1 ; ; : : : ; P I;n ; P S;n ) 2 ?H(K)=(n+1) : This theorem states that if the adversary can choose between an impersonation attack at any time i, for 1 i n, or a substitution attack at time n, then no authentication system can prevent him from being successful with probability at least 2 ?H(K)=(n+1) . Note that the lower bound for the cheating probability in a substitution attack at time i increases with i. Therefore it makes no sense to include the terms P S;1 ; : : : ; P S;n?1 in the maximization. This can be interpreted as follows: In an optimal scheme, the key is split into n + 1 parts, where the rst n parts are used to protect against an impersonation attack at times 1 i n, and the last part is used to protect against a substitution attack at the end.
For the special case of authenticating only a single message with the key K (i.e. n = 1), this means that half of the key is used for protecting against an impersonation attack, and the other half for protecting against a substitution attack. The success probability is at least one over the square root of the size of the key space: max(P I;1 ; P S;1 ) 2 ?H(K)=2 1 q jKj ; where jKj is the key space. This special case of our bounds con rms a combinatorial result already known Gilbert et al. 4 ].
